We consider a classic rendezvous game where two players try to meet each other on a set of n locations. In each round, every player visits one of the locations and the game nishes when the players meet at the same location. The goal is to devise strategies for both players that minimize the expected waiting time till the rendezvous.
Introduction
The Anderson-Weber strategy has been analyzed for small values of n. It is known that picking the right θ yields an optimum strategy for n = 2 [6] and for n = 3 [9] , this latter result being much more di cult to prove. For n = 4, as proved by Weber [8] there is a slightly better strategy outside of the framework of Anderson and Weber. However, in general it is conjectured that the Anderson-Weber strategy is asymptotically optimum: there is no strategy for arbitrary n that would yield an asymptotic expected waiting time smaller than (roughly) 0.829n. However, to the best of our knowledge, no asymptotic lower bound higher than n+1 2 , which holds even for the asymmetric variant, was known prior to this work.
Our contribution. We prove that for every n 2, in the symmetric rendezvous game on n locations the expected waiting time needs to be signi cantly larger than n+1 2 . Precisely, if the players are requested to follow the same strategy, then whatever strategy they choose, the expected waiting time will be at least n+1 2 + εn for ε = 2 −36 . See Theorem 1 in Section 2 for a formal statement. While this still leaves a large gap to the best known upper bound of 0.829n, due to Anderson and Weber [6] , this seems to be the rst lower bound for arbitrary n that signi cantly distinguishes the symmetric case from the asymmetric case, where n+1 2 is the optimum. The idea behind our proof can be explained as follows. As in other works, e.g. [9] , we restrict the game to the rst n rounds and prove a lower bound already for this simpler game. We classify deterministic strategies of the players (which we call tactics) into those that rather stay at few locations and those that seek through many locations. Formally, tactics of the rst kind -the passive tactics -visit at most n/2 di erent locations, while tactics of the second kind -the active tactics -visit more than n/2 di erent locations.
The intuition drawn from the asymmetric case is that the expected waiting time is minimized when one player plays a passive tactic, while the other plays an active tactic. As now the players need to follow the same strategy (understood as a probability distribution over tactics), with probability at least 1 2 they choose to use tactics of the same kind (activity level). Then it su ces to prove that when two tactics of the same kind are played against each other, the expected waiting time is signi cantly larger than n+1 2 . To this end, we show that if same-kind tactics are employed, the probability that no rendezvous happens at all is bounded from below by a positive constant. This easily implies a better-than-n+1 2 lower bound on the expected waiting time. To analyze the probability of no rendezvous, we investigate a random variable X that indicates the total number of rendezvous if the game is not stopped when the players meet for the rst time. Then X has mean (roughly) equal to 1, so to prove that X = 0 with signi cant probability, we show that X is not well concentrated around its mean. This involves establishing a lower bound on the variance of X, which in turn follows from the assumption that the employed tactics have the same kind.
The model and the problem
In this section we formalize the considered rendezvous search game and state the main result in precise terms. As in previous works, e.g. [9] , we make the game nite by stopping it after n rounds. Precisely, if the players did not meet after n rounds, we stop the game and set n + 1 as the obtained time till rendezvous. Note that this may only decrease the expected waiting time as compared to allowing the players to play inde nitely.
We are given a set of n locations and two players, A and B. Each player has her own, private numbering of locations using numbers from [n] := {1, . . . , n}. A tactic for a player is a function τ : [n] → [n], where τ (i) is interpreted as the index of the location that the player intends to visit at round i, in her own numbering. A strategy for a player is a probability distribution σ over the tactics of this player. Note that the set of possible tactics is nite, hence we may use the discrete σeld where every subset of tactics is measurable. The sets of tactics and strategies for the game on n locations are denoted by Θ n and Σ n , respectively.
For two given strategies σ A and σ B , the game is played as follows:
• Players A and B respectively draw their tactics τ A and τ B from the strategies σ A and σ B at random.
• A permutation π : [n] → [n] that matches the numberings of locations of A and B is drawn uniformly at random. This permutation π will be called the binding.
• The waiting time till rendezvous is indicated by the random variable
Then the question of minimizing the waiting time till rendezvous for symmetric players corresponds to the problem of minimizing the expected value of T σ A , σ B over the strategies σ A and σ B , subject to σ A = σ B . Note that in this model, we assume that every player xes her tactic at the beginning of the game and then follows this tactic. Observe that this does not restrict the players in any way, as throughout the play they receive no information that could in uence the choice of the next moves. Indeed, when entering a location, the player only receives the information that the other player is not there, or otherwise the game immediately nishes. Hence, there is no point in considering adaptativity in strategies.
The main result of this work can be now phrased as follows.
Theorem 1. There exists ε > 0 such that for every n 2 and every strategy σ ∈ Σ n , we have
In the proof of Theorem 1 we will use the lower bound for the waiting time for asymmetric strategies of Anderson and Weber [6] . Note that the proof of this result also holds for the game stopped after round n.
Theorem 2 (Anderson and Weber [6] ). For every n ∈ N and pair of strategies σ A , σ B ∈ Σ n , we have
As mentioned in Section 1, the lower bound provided by Theorem 2 is tight, as witnessed by the wait-for-mommy pair of strategies: σ A is the baby strategy that deterministically picks a tactic that maps all integers i ∈ [n] to 1, while σ B is the mommy strategy that deterministically picks the identity function as the tactic.
Passive and active tactics
Let us start by taking a closer look at the mapping
We shall try to understand this mapping from the point of view of linear algebra.
For
Note that here, the tactics τ A , τ B are xed and the expectation is taken only over the choice of the binding π. Let us de ne a bilinear operator
where x, y ∈ R Θ are vectors indexed by the elements of Θ. Then
where a, b ∈ R Θ are such that a τ is the probability of drawing τ in the distribution σ A , and similarly for b τ . The main idea is as follows. As witnessed by the tightness example for Theorem 2, the operator Φ ·, · achieves its minimum possible value when the strategies σ A and σ B are sort of "orthogonal". Namely, one strategy should focus on baby-like tactics -being in a few locations and waiting for the other playerwhile the other strategy should focus on mommy-like tactics -seeking through a large number of location in search of the other player. Playing a baby-like tactic against a mommy-like tactic yields low waiting time, while the intuition is that playing two baby-like tactics against each other, or two mommy-like tactics against each other, should result in waiting time signi cantly larger than n+1 2 . When the two players are forced to use the same strategy, there is a signi cant probability -at least 1 2 -that they end up playing tactics of the same kind. This increases the expected waiting time signi cantly above n+1 2 . We now formalize this intuition, calling baby-like tactics passive and mommy-like tactics active.
De nition 3. A tactic τ ∈ Θ is called passive if |τ ([n])| n/2 and active otherwise. The sets of passive and active tactics are denoted by Θ A and Θ P , respectively.
In the next sections we will focus on the following lemma.
Before we proceed to prove Lemma 4, let us see how Theorem 1 follows from it.
. We rst note that from Theorem 2 applied to two deterministic strategies we may infer that
Let a ∈ R Θ be such that a τ is the probability that tactic τ is drawn by the strategy σ. Write
where the supports of a P and a A are passive and active tactics, respectively. As W (·, ·) is a symmetric function, we have
Let p := τ ∈Θ A a τ be the probability that σ yields a passive tactic. Then, by Lemma 4, we have
Using Lemma 4 again, we analogously infer that
A similar computation using (1) yields that
Finally, letting ε := δ/2 we can combine (2), (3), (4), and (5) to conclude that
where the last inequality follows from the convexity of the function x → x 2 .
It thus remains to prove Lemma 4.
High probability of no rendezvous gives high expected waiting time
We now start analyzing the game when played between a xed pair of tactics, with the goal of establishing lower bounds for the expected waiting time till a rendezvous. The intuition is that this waiting time should be signi cantly higher than n+1 2 provided the probability that during the n rounds of the game there is no rendezvous at all is bounded from below by some positive constant. This is made formal in the following lemma.
P . Let Z be the random variable de ned as the waiting time till the rst rendezvous, that is,
Note that here τ A , τ B are xed, so Z depends only on the random choice of the binding π; formally, Z is π-measurable. Then
Observe that Z is a random variable with values in {1, 2, . . . , n + 1}, hence we have EZ = n k=0 P(Z > k).
Note that we have Z > k if and only if during the rst k rounds the players did not meet. Clearly, during every xed round, the players meet with probability 1 n . Hence, by the union bound, the probability that they do not meet during the rst k rounds is at least 1 − k n . On the other hand, by the assumption of the lemma, this probability is also at least β. We conclude that
By combining the above observations it follows that
This concludes the proof.
Thus, by Lemma 5, for the proof of Lemma 4 it su ces to show that the probability that no rendezvous occurs throughout the n rounds of the game is bounded away from zero. Set m := |F | and note that m n. Similarly, for the random binding π, let
High variance gives high probability of no rendezvous
For f ∈ F , let X f be the indicator random variable taking value 1 if f ∈ E(π) and 0 otherwise. Further, let
Note that here τ A , τ B are considered xed and π is drawn at random, hence (X f ) f ∈F and therefore X depend only on the choice of the random binding π; formally, these variables are π-measurable. Observe that the probability that no rendezvous occurs can be understood in terms of the random variable X as follows:
From now on, we adopt the above notation whenever the pair of tactics τ A , τ B is clear from the context. The next lemma is the key conceptual step in the proof. We show that in order to give a lower bound on the probability that no rendezvous occurs, it su ces to give a lower bound on the variance of X.
for some constant α > 0. Then
The proof of Lemma 6 spans the rest of this section. The intuition is that high variance of X means that X is not well concentrated around its mean, which in turns implies that the probability of it being below the mean -equivalently equal to 0 -is high. Hence, we need to understand the mean of X as well as estimate its higher moments.
Observe that if f = (i, j) ∈ F , then the probability that π(i) = j is equal to 1 n . Hence, X f takes value 1 with probability 1 n and 0 with probability 1 − 1 n . Consequently, we have
By linearity of expectation, EX = m n 1.
In the sequel we will also need an upper bound on the fourth central moment of X, that is, on E|X − EX| 4 . To this end, we rst establish, in the next two assertions, an upper bound on the fourth moment of X, that is, on EX 4 . Assertion 1. For pairwise di erent pairs e, f, g, h ∈ F , we have
EX e X f X g X h 1 n(n − 1)(n − 2)(n − 3) . P . Let us focus on the rst inequality. Write e = (i, j) and f = (i , j ). Observe that if i = i or j = j , then X e and X f cannot simultaneously be equal to 1 since e = f , and hence X e X f = 0 surely. Otherwise, the probability that for π chosen uniformly at random we have π(i) = j and π(i ) = j is 1 n(n−1) . Consequently P(X e X f = 1) = 1 n(n−1) . This implies the rst inequality. The proofs of the remaining two inequalities are analogous. Assertion 2. It holds that EX 4 15.
P
. For each e ∈ F , since X e ∈ {0, 1} we have X e = X 2 e = X 3 e = X 4 e . By Assertion 1 and the fact that m n, we have This concludes the proof.
We will also use the following well-known anti-concentration inequality.
Theorem 7 (Paley-Zygmund inequality, [7] ). Let Z be a non-negative random variable with nite variance and let λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
With all the tools prepared, we proceed with the proof of Lemma 6. We use Theorem 7 with λ = 1 2 for the random variable Z := |X − EX| 2 .
By Assertion 2 and the fact that EX 1, we have
As EZ = VarX α, from Theorem 7 we infer that P (Z α/2) P (Z EZ/2)
Observe now that the assumption that m > 1 − α/2 · n implies that
This, in turns, implies that the event |X − EX| 2 α/2
is disjoint with the event {X = 1}. By combining this with (7), we conclude that
Since X is a non-negative integer-valued random variable with mean not larger than 1, we have P(X = 1) = P(X = 0) + P(X 2) and P(X = 0) P(X 2).
By combining the two inequalities above we conclude that P(X = 0)
This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.
Many disjoint pairs give high variance
Two pairs (i, j) and (i , j ), each in [n] × [n], are disjoint if i = i and j = j . We now prove that to ensure that for a pair of tactics τ A , τ B , the variance of X is high, it su ces to show that among pairs in F , there is a quadratic number of pairs of pairs that are disjoint.
Lemma 8. Suppose τ A , τ B ∈ Θ are such that there are at least α n 2 disjoint pairs in F , for some positive constant α. Then VarX α.
P
. As in the proof of Assertion 1, we observe that for every pair of di erent elements e, f ∈ F , we have
if e and f are disjoint; 0 otherwise.
Therefore, for all di erent e, f ∈ F we have VarX e = EX 2 e − (EX e ) 2 = n − 1 n 2 , and
where the expression [e ∩ f = ∅] takes value 1 if e and f are disjoint, and 0 otherwise. Consequently,
which is at least α because m n. This concludes the proof.
Finding many disjoint pairs
Finally, we prove that if τ A and τ B are two tactics of the same kind, then the set of pairs F de ned for τ A and τ B contains many pairs of disjoint pairs. For this, it will be convenient to interpret F as the edge set of a bipartite graph, with each side of the bipartition consisting of a copy of the set [n]. In this view, a pair of disjoint pairs corresponds to a pair of disjoint edges: two edges in a graph being disjoint if all the four endpoints of these edges are pairwise di erent. We rst prove the following graph-theoretic lemma. The degree deg(u) of a vertex u in a graph G is the number of edges of G incident to u. Lemma 9. Let G = (A, B, E) be a bipartite graph such that A and B -the sides of the bipartition -have size n each, 11 12 n |E| n, and the degree of each vertex in G is at most 2 3 n. Then there are two disjoint subsets of edges E 1 , E 2 ⊆ E, each of size at least n/8, such that every edge from E 1 is disjoint with every edge in E 2 .
P
. For X ⊆ A ∪ B, we let deg(X) := u∈X deg(u). Let a 1 , . . . , a n be the vertices of A in non-increasing order with respect to their degrees. Let t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} be the largest index such that A 1 := {a 1 , . . . , a t } satis es deg(A 1 ) 2 3 n. Since the degree of every vertex is at most 2 3 n and |E| > 2 3 n, we know that neither A 1 nor A 2 := A \ A 1 is empty. In other words, t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Further, since deg(A 1 ) 2 3 n, deg(A 1 ∪ {a t+1 }) > 2 3 n, and deg(a t+1 ) deg(v) for every v ∈ A 1 , it follows that deg(A 1 ) > n/3. Since deg(A 1 ) 2 3 n, and deg(A) = |E| 11 12 n, we also have deg(A 2 ) n/4. We conclude that we have found a partition A 1 A 2 of A such that = (A, B, F ) be the bipartite graph constructed by taking A and B to be two disjoint copies of the set [n], and interpreting each pair (i, j) ∈ F as an edge that connects the copy of i in A with the copy of j in B. We now verify that G satis es the prerequisites of Lemma 9. We have |F | 11 12 n by assumption, so we are left with checking the requirements on degrees.
Suppose rst τ A , τ B ∈ Θ A . Then |τ A ([n])| n/2, so there are only at most n/2 indices i ∈ [n] that may be the rst coordinates of pairs from F . Hence in G, the degree of every vertex in B is at most n/2. A symmetric reasoning shows that the degree of every vertex in A is at most n/2.
Suppose now that τ A , τ B ∈ Θ P . Then |τ A ([n])| > n/2, hence there are at least n+1 2 indices i ∈ [n] that are the rst coordinates of pairs from F . Every i ∈ [n] is the rst coordinate of at most n+1 2 pairs from F . Indeed, otherwise it would not be possible that each of the at least n−1 2 indices i ∈ τ A ([n]) \ {i} would be the rst coordinate of one of the remaining less than n−1 2 pairs from F . This means that in G, the degree of each vertex from A is at most n+1 2 2 3 n. A symmetric reasoning shows that the degree of each vertex from B is at most 2 3 n. Having veri ed the prerequisites of Lemma 9, we can conclude that there exist disjoint subsets of pairs F 1 , F 2 ⊆ F , each of size at least n/8, such that every pair from F 1 is disjoint with every pair from F 2 . This implies that in F there are at least n 2 64 1 32 · n 2 pairs of pairs that are disjoint. By Lemma 8, this implies that VarX 
Wrapping up the proof
With all the tools prepared, we are now in a position to prove Lemma 4. P ( L 4). Let F , m, and X be de ned for τ A , τ B as in Section 3.3. We rst consider the corner case when m 11 12 n. Then EX = m n 11 12 .
Therefore, by Markov's inequality we infer that P(X = 0) = 1 − P(X 1) 1 − 11 12 = 1 12 .
Now consider the case when m > 11 12 n. By Lemma 10 we infer that VarX 1 32 . Applying Lemma 6 for α = 1 32 , we conclude that in this case P(X = 0) 1 128 · 32 2 = 2 −17 .
Note here that the assumption m 1 − α/2 · n is satis ed, because 1 − α/2 = 7 8 < 11 12 . Hence, we have P(X = 0) 2 −17 in both cases. By Lemma 5 we now conclude that W (τ A , τ B ) n + 1 2 + 2 −35 · n.
Hence, Lemma 4 holds for δ = 2 −35 .
